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Abstract
This paper studies the equilibrium predatory practices that may arise when the
borrowers have behavioral weaknesses. Rational lenders offer short term contracts
that can be renewed at the cost of paying a penalty fee. We show how the optimal
contracts depend on the degree of na¨ıvete´ of the time inconsistent customers. Penalty
fees have a dual role : they increase market share by providing a useful commitment
device to time-inconsistent but otherwise rational borrowers ; they are also a source
of revenue from the semi-na¨ıve borrowers who understand the need for commitment
but fail to forecast their future time discount factor. We also show that perfect com-
petition does not eliminate predatory practices, since the equilibrium contract entails
a subsidized (below marginal cost) short-term loan that can only be profitable if a
fraction of the borrowers end up paying the penalty fee.
JEL : D03, D18, D49, D86
Keywords : hyperbolic discounting, time inconsistency, sophistication, partial na¨ıvete´,
exploitative contracts, credit cards
1 Introduction
The paper focuses on the equilibrium predatory practices that may arise when the bor-
rowers have behavioral weaknesses. Our main assumption is that the borrowers have the
(δ, β, β˜) quasi-hyperbolic preferences introduced by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 2001).
This assumption has two components. First, the quasi-hyperbolic preferences imply that
the borrowers have a self-control problem (their inability to resist the urges of immedi-
ate consumption), which may lead to time-inconsistent choices, since their preferences are
time-varying. Second, the borrowers are not fully aware of the dynamics of their prefer-
ences (they tend to overestimate their future discount factor). This second hypothesis,
which we label the na¨ıvete´ hypothesis will turn out to be a crucial element of the analysis.
The lending institutions are fully rational. They are aware of the behavioral weaknesses
of their customers and will devise contracts that take advantage of those weaknesses. The
∗EQUIPPE, EA n◦4018 CNRS. and Universite´ du Littoral. Email: rodrigue.mendez@free.fr.
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purpose of the paper is to make a systematic exploration of those contracts, which we
label exploitative contracts. We assume that the lending institutions offer short-terms
lending contracts that can be renewed, at a cost. The contracts have therefore two main
characteristics : the interest rate R and the roll-over fee F .
We show that the optimal exploitative contracts depend crucially on the degree of
na¨ıvete´ of the borrowers. Sophisticated individuals (those who are fully aware of the
dynamics of their preferences) cannot be fooled. They are offered contract with positive
fees, where the fees are used as a commitment device (that allows them to implement
their optimal consumption path). This is no longer the case with na¨ıve borrowers. Fully
na¨ıves don’t understand the commitment value of the fees, and therefore focus only on the
interest rate (since they don’t expect to pay the fee). The optimal contract is one with
high interest rates and zero fees. Partially na¨ıves understand the commitment value of the
fee, but can nevertheless be fooled, since they overestimate their future discount factor.
The optimal contract is one with high interest rates and a positive fee, that the borrowers
end-up paying in some configurations. Deceitful contracts thus only arise with partially
na¨ıves borrowers in the monopoly case.
Most authors argue that competition should eliminate the predatory practices. We
show that this is not the case in our framework. Perfect competition allows the sophisti-
cated consumers to take the whole surplus (the equilibrium interest rate falls to marginal
cost and the firm’s profits are zero at equilibrium). But predatory contracts do persists as
long as a there is a small fraction of na¨ıves. The optimal equilibrium contract is clearly
based on deceit, since the firms offer short term loans at discount rates (rates below
marginal cost) that can only be profitable if a fraction of customers roll over the loan
and thus end up paying the penalty fee they did not expect to pay. Perfect competition
implies that the lending firms do not profit from their predatory practices in equilibrium
(profits are null in equilibrium). The main beneficiaries of the deceitful contracts are the
sophisticated borrowers who benefit from the discount rates, and use the penalty fee as a
commitment device.
This paper is related to the growing literature on contracting with boundedly rational
agents which started with the seminal contribution of Della Vigna and Malmendier (2004)
(henceforth referred as D&M). Their model is a three period version of the (δ, β, β˜) model
of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 2001). They show that the optimal two-part contract
depends on the nature of the good provided by the firm. They distinguish two types of
goods : leisure good, which provides current benefits, but have future costs and investment
good, that have current costs and future benefits. A monopoly that sells a leisure good
should choose a low entry cost and a high usage cost (i.e. above marginal cost) to take
advantage of the na¨ıve’s tendency to underestimate their future usage. If the firm sells an
investment good, the optimal pricing policy is the converse : a high fixed cost and a low
usage cost (below marginal cost), in order to exploit the semi-na¨ıves tendency tendency to
overestimate their future usage as well as their demand for commitment (which is provided
by the high entry cost).
Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2009) focus on over-commitment. Semi-na¨ıves individuals who
want to avoid the future consumption of an harmful good (a leisure good using D&M
terminology), have the opportunity to buy a costly commitment technology. But most of
them end up buying the good anyway as they underestimate their lack of self-control. The
authors show that higher sophistication (greater awareness of the self control problem)
is often worse than full na¨ıvete´, since it increases the spending on commitment without
preventing the consumption of the harmful good. Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2010) studies
exploitative contracts in the credit card and mortgage market. Even though they assume
2
full competition, their results are similar to D&M : the equilibrium contracts have low
teaser rates for short term loans and large penalty fees for those who fall behind on their
payment schedule.
The subject of Gottlieb (2008) is competition over time-inconsistent consumers. They
point that the impact of competition on the pricing of leisure goods depends crucially on
the customer’s switching costs. D&M pricing (lump-sum transfers to bait customers and
above marginal cost usage price) requires exclusive contracts. When those contracts are
not feasible, firms choose marginal cost pricing (and zero lump-sum transfers).
Others significant contributions are Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) and Gabaix and Laibson
(2006). Both show how firms may profit by devising contracts that discriminate between
sophisticated and na¨ıve customers. In the Eliaz & Spiegler setting, the agents differ in their
ability to forecast the change in their future tastes. The optimal menu of contract provides
perfect commitment devices for the sophisticated consumers, and exploitative contracts for
the na¨ıve. Gabaix & Laibson analyze the issue of informational shrouding. Firms offer a
base good and and add-ons. They show how firms may exploit myopic consumers through
marketing schemes that offers cheap base goods and shroud high-priced add-ons, and how
sophisticated consumers profit from those schemes. They also show that competition does
not eliminate shrouding.
Empirical evidence on the pricing of investment good is provided by Della Vigna and
Malmendier (2006) in the context of the health club markets. Della Vigna and Malmendier
(2004) also gives (second hand) evidence of the pricing of leisure goods with switching costs
(credit cards, mobile phones). Gottlieb (2008) provides evidence of the pricing on leisure
goods with switching costs in competitive industries (Tobacco and and alcohol industries).
Gabaix and Laibson (2006) provide evidence on shrouding in the retail banking industry
and in the printer market. First hand evidence on the practices of the credit card industry
can be found in Ausubel (1991) and Shui and Asubel (1995) A full presentation of the
payday loan market can be found in Stegman (2007) and Agarwal et al. (2009).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Sections 3 and 4 analyze
the optimal pricing strategy under monopolistic conditions. The form and the impact of
the contract depend crucially on the degree of na¨ıvete´ of the borrowers. Section 3 estab-
lishes the optimal contract for sophisticated borrowers, whereas section 4 show how firms
can take advantage of the borrower’s na¨ıvete´. Section 5 analyzes the effect of competition
on the equilibrium pricing strategies. Section 6.1 studies the impact of predatory lending
on the welfare of the borrowers under monopoly and competition. Section 7 concludes.
All proofs omitted in the main text are given in the appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Intertemporal Preferences
We assume that the borrowers have (δ, β, β˜) quasi-hyperbolic intertemporal preferences
At time t, the present value of the flow of future utilities (us)s≥t is :
ut + β
∑
s≥t+1
δs−tus (1)
where δ ≤ 1 is the long-run discount factor and β ≤ 1 is the short-run one. β < 1 results
from a self-control problem (the inability to resist to the urges of immediate consumption)
Quasi-hyperbolic preferences (henceforth referred as q-hyper pref) imply that discounting
is time-varying, since the discount factor between t + 1 and t + 2 is δ at time t and βδ
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at time t + 1. Time consistency thus requires β = 1. β can therefore be considered as a
measure of the degree of time inconsistency of the agent.
The parameter β ≤ β˜ ≤ 1 is the expected short-run discount factor. A na¨ıve agent
overestimate his future discount factor (he expects - erroneously - to have the discount
function 1, β˜δ, β˜δ2, .. in all future periods). An agent with β˜ = 1 is said to be fully na¨ıve,
whereas an agent with β˜ = β is a sophisticated one. β˜ − β is therefore a measure of
the degree of the agent’s na¨ıvete´ (the tendency to believe that his lack of self-control is
temporary)
For the sake of simplicity we assume from now on that : (i) individuals live three
periods ; (ii) their instantaneous utility is linear ; and (iii) the long-run discount factor is
δ = 1.
2.2 The lending institution
The lending institution is a fully rational profit maximizing monopoly. The firm has
zero fixed and marginal costs (the lending institution can borrow at zero cost from the
central bank, her discount rate is thus zero). The firm proposes two types of borrowing
contracts : a short-run contract and a long run one.
• The short-run contract (henceforth referred as SR contract). The firm lends for
one period (at interest rate R), and gives the individual the possibility to rollover
the debt for one period more. The option to rollover is costly. An individual that
chooses to rollover must pay a penalty F on the outstanding debt. The total cost
of borrowing is therefore R for the borrowers that repay in time and R(R + F ) for
the borrowers that choose to rollover. Profit is therefore R − 1 per unit lent in the
former case, and R(R+F )− 1 in the latter case (recall that the firm’s discount rate
is zero).
• The long-run contract (LR). The firm lends for two periods at interest rate R (per
period), which yield a profit equal to R2 − 1.
The firm is fully aware of the self-control and na¨ıvete´ problems. Contracts are designed
to exploit them.
2.3 The distribution of (β, β˜)
The borrowers are heterogenous. There is a continuum of agents of size one. We
assume that the short-run discount factor β are uniformly distributed on the support [β0,
1], where β0 is the short-run discount factor of the most impatient borrower.
We also assume that the expected short-run discount factor β˜ is an increasing function
of β, with :
β˜(β) =
{
β¯ if β < β¯
β if β ≥ β¯ (2)
This formulation implies that all individuals with β < β¯ are na¨ıves, whereas all individual
with β ≥ β¯ are fully sophisticated. The na¨ıvete´ and the lack of self-control are correlated
since β˜ − β is decreasing in β.
3 Contracting with sophisticated borrowers
We assume in this section that all the borrowers are fully sophisticated (β¯ = β0).
We first study the optimal contract when penalties are not allowed. Then we show that
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penalties increase both the profit of the firm and the welfare of the borrowers.
3.1 The optimal contract when penalties are not allowed
At time t = 1, the net benefit of borrowing one unit is (1 − βR) if the agent repays
at time t = 2, and (1 − βR2) if the agent repays at time t = 3. One-period borrowing is
thus better for the agent (the converse is true for the firm, who earns R− 1 with the short
term contract and R2 − 1 with the long term one).
All agents with β ≤ 1/R wish to borrow for one period. Yet, sophisticated agents
know that their intertemporal preferences will change at time t = 2. The net benefit of
deferring the repayment, which is R−R = 0 at time t = 1, will be, at time t = 2, (1−βR).
Therefore all agents who choose to borrow for one period at time t = 1 will rollover at
time t = 2, and end up paying R2 at time t = 3. Since two-period borrowing is profitable
only for agents with β ≤ 1/R2, all agents with β > 1/R2 will choose not to borrow. Figure
1 represents the choice of the individuals in the [β0, 1] space.
1/R 1/R 1β0
2-period
β
2
Contract
Figure 1: The Choices of sophisticated borrowers (F = 0)
This implies that the interest rate chosen by the firm must not exceed 1/
√
β0 (since
no one borrows when β0R
2 > 1), in which case the firm earns R2− 1 per unit lent to each
agent in the interval [β0, 1/R
2]. Assuming that the agents can borrow at most one unit 1,
the firm’s profit function Π(R,F ) writes :
Π(R, 0) =
{
(R2 − 1)G(1/R2) if 1 ≤ R ≤ 1/√β0
0 if R > 1/
√
β0
(3)
where G(β) = (β − β0)/(1− β0) is the cumulative distribution function of β. It is easy to
show that the profit function is concave in the interval [1, 1/
√
β0]. The maximum profit is
reached when R = R∗0 ≡ (1/β0)1/4.
3.2 The optimal contract with penalties
Introducing penalties will increase both the firm’s profit and the average welfare of the
borrowers.
The reason is that penalties are used as a commitment device by the borrowers. Recall
that all borrowers with β ∈]1/R2, 1/R[ wish to borrow (since 1−βR > 0) but choose not to
since they know that they will rollover, and rollover is not profitable for them. A penalty
changes the net benefit of deferring repayment at t = 2, which is now 1−β(R+F ), which
implies that rollover is no longer profitable for all agents with β > 1/(R + F ). Knowing
this, all agents with β ∈ [1/(R+ F ), 1/R] choose to borrow for one period. The behavior
of the other agents is not modified. Figure 2 represents the choice of the sophisticated
borrowers in the [β0, 1] space when F is positive.
1This assumption is not essential. All we need is that all agents borrow the same amount.
5
1/R 1/R 1β0
2-period 1-period
1/(R+F)
β
2
Contract Contract
Figure 2: The Choices of sophisticated borrowers (F > 0)
Let’s compute the profit, assuming that the interest rate is R = R∗0 and that 1/(R
∗
0)
2 ≤
1/(R∗0+F ). The profit of the firm is the sum of the profit made on the 2-period contracts
Π(R∗0, 0) and the profit made on the one-period contract.
Π(R∗0, F ) = Π(R
∗
0, 0) + (R− 1) [G(1/R∗0)−G(1/(R∗0 + F ))] (4)
which is clearly an increasing function of F . The maximum is reached when 1/(R∗0)
2 =
1/(R∗0+F )⇒ F ∗0 = R∗0(R∗0− 1). This results from the fact that choosing a penalty above
F ∗0 allows the individuals in the interval [1/(R
∗
0 + F ), 1/(R
∗
0)
2] to replace their 2-period
contract by one-period ones, which clearly reduces the profit of the firm by (R∗0)
2−R∗0 per
contract.
To compute the optimal (RS , FS) we must write the profit function. Assuming that
F < 1/β0 − 1/
√
β0, the profit function writes :
Π(R,F ) =


(R2 − 1)G
(
1
R+F
)
+ (R− 1)
[
G
(
1
R
)−G( 1R+F )] if 1≤R<RF
(R2 − 1)G ( 1
R2
)
+ (R− 1)
[
G
(
1
R
)−G( 1R+F )] if RF≤R< 1√β0
(R− 1)
[
G
(
1
R
)−G( 1R+F )] if 1√β0≤R< 1β0−F
(R− 1)G ( 1R) if 1β0−F≤R≤ 1β0
(5)
where RF = (1 +
√
1 + 4F )/2 is the unique positive solution of the equation 1/R2 =
1/(R+ F ). 2
Proof. It is obvious that no one borrows for R > 1/β0. One period contracts are
chosen by all individuals when 1/β0−F ≤ R ≤ 1/β0. This results from the fact that they
are profitable for all individuals (since βR < 1, ∀β) and that the borrowers know that
they will not rollover (since β(R + F ) > 1, ∀β). The profit is (R − 1) times the number
of contracts G(1/R). Note that 2-period contracts are nor an alternative since βR2 > 1,
∀β. One-period contact are still the only alternative when 1/√β0 ≤ R ≤ 1/β0 − F , but
they will be chosen only by a fraction of the individuals, since all the agents will β such
that β(R + F ) ≤ 1 know that they will rollover. The profit is therefor R − 1 times the
number of contracts G(1/R)−G(1/(R+ F )). Choosing R ≤ 1/√β0 allows the individual
to choose between one-period and 2-period contracts. One-period contracts will be chosen
by all those who don’t expect to rollover (those with β such that β(R+F ) > 1), the others
will chose either a 2-period contract (if βR2 < 1) or to abstain from borrowing (if 1/R2 <
β < 1/(R+F )). The no-borrowing zone disappears when 1/R2 > 1(R+F ) ⇐⇒ R > RF .
Thus the profit is R2− 1 times the number of 2-period contracts (G(1/R2) when R ≥ RF ,
and G(1/(R + F )) when R < RF ) plus R − 1 times the number of one-period contracts
G(1/R)−G(1/(R+ F )).
2The restriction F < 1/β0−1/
√
β0 ensures that RF lies in the interval [1, 1/
√
β0]. We show in appendix
A.1 that the optimal F lies in the interval [0, 1/β0 − 1/
√
β0].
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As we can see in figure 3, the maximum profit is reached for RS = RF . The penalty
is set at a level that : (i) ensures all agents choose either a one-period contract or a
two-period contract ; (ii) avoids the cannibalization of 2-period contracts by one-period
contracts.
0  
 
F = 0
F ≥ 1/β0 − 1
F = FS
RF
R
Π(R,FS)
1/β0 − FS 1/β01 1/
√
β0
Figure 3: The profit function with sophisticated borrowers for F = FS
In the appendix A.2, we show that the optimal (RS , FS) couple is :
3
RS =
(
1
β0
)1/3
(6)
FS = RS(RS − 1) =
(
1
β0
)1/3(
1−
(
1
β0
)1/3)
(7)
4 Contracting with na¨ıve borrowers
We first we study the full na¨ıvete´ case (β¯ = 1). Then we look at the partial na¨ıvete´
case β0 < β¯ < 1
4.1 Full na¨ıvete´
In this case the potential borrowers don’t expect to rollover (since β˜(R+F ) = R+F >
1, ∀R > 1, F ≥ 0). Thus all the agents who wish to borrow one period (those with
β ≤ 1/R) will do so. Of course, all agents with β < 1/(R + F ) will rollover and pay
the penalty. Now the firm must balance the additional income generated by the penalty
fees and the loss of some 2-period borrowers due to the penalty (recall that the agents
in the [1/(R + F ), 1/R] interval do not rollover). Figure 4 represents the choices of the
individuals when β0 < 1/(R+ F ) :
3The subscript S stands for sophisticated.
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1/R 1β0
1-period Contract 1-period
1/(R+F)
β
+ Rollover Contract
Figure 4: The Choices of fully na¨ıve borrowers
The profit function of the firm writes :
Π(R,F ) =
{
(R(R+F )−1)G( 1R+F )+(R−1)[G( 1R)−G( 1R+F )] if 1≤R< 1β0−F
(R−1)G( 1R) if R≥ 1β0−F
(8)
Proof. All agent with β ≤ 1/R borrow for one period. If R ≥ 1/β0 − F the penalty is big
enough to deter rollover for all agents (β(R + F ) > 1, ∀β). The profit is (R-1) times the
number of contracts G(1/R). This is no longer the case for R < 1/β0 − F . The agents
whose β < 1/(R+F ) will rollover and pay the penalty. The profit is (R(R+F)-1) times the
number individual who rollover G(1/(R+F )) plus R− 1 times the number of individuals
who don’t G(1/R)−G(1/(R+ F )).
It is easy to show that (i) the firm chooses a contract with zero penalty (F˜ = 0); and
(ii) the optimal interest rate RN is such that 1/
√
β0 < RN < 1/β0 (see the appendix for
the proof). The figure 5 shows the optimal solution.
The logic of the no-penalty result is straightforward. Introducing a penalty F leads to
a gain of F on the G(1/(R+F )) individuals that continue to rollover and a loss of R2−R
on the G(1/R)−G(1/(R+ F )) individuals that no longer rollover. The net gain is :
F ×G
(
1
R+ F
)
−R(R− 1)
[
G
(
1
R
)
−G
(
1
R+ F
)]
= F
1
R+F − β0
1− β0 −R(R− 1)
1
R − 1R+F
1− β0
= − 1
1− β0
F 2
R+ F
< 0
which is always negative. Adding a penalty is therefore never profitable when the borrowers
are fully na¨ıve.
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0  
 
1 1/β0
R
1/
√
β0
Π(R, 0)
RN
Figure 5: The profit function with fully na¨ıve borrowers
4.2 Partial na¨ıvete´
There are three equilibrium configurations in the partial na¨ıvete´ case, which we label :
(i) nearly sophisticated ; (ii) sophisticated na¨ıve ; and (iii) nearly na¨ıve. In the following
we characterize each configuration (full proofs are given in appendix C).
4.2.1 Configuration 1 : Nearly sophisticated
This is the equilibrium configuration when β¯ is low (β¯ ∈ [β0, β¯1[) 4. As can be seen in
figure 6, this configuration is such that β¯ < 1/R2 = 1/(R + F ). Thus all the agents with
β ≤ 1/(R + F ) (rightly) expects to rollover. Recall that the expected discount factor is
β˜(β) = β ≥ β¯ for the sophisticated agents and β˜(β) = β¯ for the na¨ıve ones, which implies
that the expected discount factor is small enough (β˜(β) < 1/(R+F ), ∀β < 1/(R+F )) to
send the right signal to the na¨ıve borrowers (do not sign the one-period contract since you
will rollover!). Therefore all agents whose β > 1/(R+ F ) choose the one-period contract,
whereas those with β ≤ 1/(R+F ) choose the 2-period contract 5 No penalty is ever paid.
The configuration 1 equilibrium is an “honest” equilibrium where no one is fooled, and
the penalty fee F is used as a commitment device for both the na¨ıve and sophisticated
borrowers. The equilibrium (R,F ) pair is the same as the one chosen when all individuals
are sophisticated (R = RS = (1/β0)
1/3, F = FS = RS(RS − 1)).
4The value of β¯1 is given in appendix C
5The firm chooses R such that 1/R2 = 1/(R+ F ) since 1/R2 < 1/(R+ F ) leads to the loss of valuable
consumers and 1/R2 > 1/(R+ F ) leads to the cannibalization of 2-period contracts by the less profitable
one-period contracts.
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1/R 1β0
2-periods 1-period
1/(R+F)=1/R2
β
Contract Contract
β
_
Naïve Sophisticated
Figure 6: Configuration 1 : Nearly sophisticated
4.2.2 Configuration 2 : Sophisticated na¨ıves
This is the equilibrium configuration for intermediate β¯ (β¯ ∈ [β¯1, β¯2[) 6. As can be
seen in figure 7, this configuration is such that β¯ = 1/(R + F ) > 1/R2. Therefore all
borrowers choose the one-period contracts (no one expects to rollover since β˜ ≥ β¯, ∀β).
This is the right decision for the sophisticated agents, since they will not rollover (β ≥
1/(R + F ), ∀β ≥ β¯), and the wrong decision for the na¨ıve ones (since they will rollover
and pay the penalty).
1/R 1β0
1-period Contract 1-period
1/(R+F)=
β
+ Rollover Contract
Naïve Sophisticated
1/R2 β
_
Figure 7: Configuration 2 : Sophisticated na¨ıve
The penalty has therefore a dual role in configuration 2. The penalty is used as
a commitment device for the sophisticated agents (who would choose to abstain from
borrowing if F = 0), and as a bait for the na¨ıve ones. Note that the optimal behavior for
the na¨ıve agents would be either to borrow for two periods (for those with β < 1/R2) or
to abstain from borrowing (for those with β ≥ 1/R2).
We show in appendix C that the optimal interest rate and penalty fee are : 7
RSN =
√
β¯
β0 − β¯(1− β¯)
(9)
FSN =
1
β¯
−RSN = 1
β¯
−
√
β¯
β0 − β¯(1− β¯
(10)
The figure 8 represents the profit as a function of R when F = FSN .
6The value of β¯2 is given in appendix C
7The subscript SN stands for sophisticated na¨ıve.
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0  
 
R
1/
√
β0 1/β0
Π(R,FSN)
1/β0 − FSN1/β¯ − FSN
Figure 8: The profit function with sophisticated na¨ıves.
4.2.3 Configuration 3 : Nearly na¨ıve
This is the equilibrium configuration when β¯ is high (β¯ ∈ [β¯2, 1]). As can be seen in
figure 9, this configuration is such that β¯ ≥ 1/R. The optimal interest rate is such that :
(i) sophisticated agents do not borrow ; and (ii) all na¨ıve agents borrow for one period
and then rollover in the second period. As in fully naive case, the choice of the optimal
penalty fee must balance the additional income generated by the fee and the loss of some
two-period contracts caused by this fee. We show in appendix C that, as in the fully na¨ıve
case the optimal penalty fee is zero. 8.
1β0
1-period Contract
1/R
β
+ Rollover
Naïve Sophisticated
1/R2
_
β
Figure 9: Configuration 3 : Nearly na¨ıve
There are two sub-configurations, depending on the value of β¯. Configuration 3.1,
which is the equilibrium configuration for β¯ ∈ [β¯2, 1/RN [, is such that :9
RNN = 1/β¯ (11)
FNN = 0 (12)
8Note that the borrowers can be considered as fully na¨ıve (even if they have on average an expected β˜
closer to their true β, they act exactly as if they were fully na¨ıves in equilibrium)
9The subscript NN stands for nearly na¨ıve.
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Configuration 3.2, which is the equilibrium configuration for β¯ ∈ [1/RN , 1], is such that :
RNN = RN (13)
FNN = 0 (14)
where RN is the interest rate chosen by the firm when consumers are fully na¨ıve (section
section 4.1).
4.3 The impact of na¨ıvete´ on the optimal strategies and the profit per
customer
The figures 10, 11 and 12 plot the optimal interest rate, the optimal fee and the profit
per customer as a function of the index of na¨ıvete´ β¯ when β0 = 2/2.
0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
1.16
1.18
1.2
1.22
1.24
1.26
1.28
β¯
R
RSN
RN
RN S
RS
Figure 10: The optimal interest rate as a function of the index of na¨ıvete´ β¯
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5 The Impact of Competition
This section studies the impact of full competition on the equilibrium pricing strategies.
We assume the following : (i) entry is unrestricted and costless, (ii) there are no capacity
constraints, and (ii) firms compete by announcing a (R, F ) couple. We show that the
impact of competition depends crucially on the degree of na¨ıvete´ of the borrowers. We first
study the polar cases (full na¨ıvete´ and full sophistication), then we solve the intermediate
case (β0 < β¯ < 1).
5.1 Fully sophisticated versus fully na¨ıves
Lets’s examine the impact of competition when the borrowers are fully sophisticated.
Competition is a two dimensions game, since firms may increase their market share either
by reducing R or by increasing F . However, it is easy to show that choosing a slightly
lower interest rate than the other firms is always the dominant strategy. Suppose for
instance that there are two identical firms and let R2 > 1 and F2 > 0 be the interest
rate and the fee chosen by firm 2. Firm 1 may increase its profit by choosing any F1 >
F2, as long as (1/R2)
2 < 1/(R2 + F2) (Firm 1 takes all the consumers in the interval
[1/(R2 + F1), 1/(R2 + F2)], which yields a net profit equal to (R − 1) per consumer) 10.
But decreasing marginally the interest rate (choosing R1 = R2 − ϵ) is a much better
strategy, since it allows the firm to take the whole market (profits are multiplied by a
factor slightly less than 2). Of course, the same logic applies for firm 2. Therefore the
equilibrium is such that R1 = R2 = 1, which implies that the fees are no longer needed.
The same reasoning applies for any number of firms. Firm’s profits are null at equilibrium
and all the surplus is taken by the consumers. Furthermore, time inconsistency is no
longer a problem, since borrowing at period 2 at interest rate R = 1 entails no loss from
the point of view of the period one self.
Has competition the same beneficial effects when borrowers are fully na¨ıve? Na¨ıve
borrowers are not aware of the benefits and dangers of the penalty fees, since they don’t
10This applies as long as 1/(R2 + F1) ≥ (1/R2)2. Increasing further R1 leads to a loss for firm 1, due to
the cannibalization of the 2-period contracts by the 1-period ones.
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realize their time inconsistency problem. They, therefore, do not take into account the
fee when comparing the borrowing contracts. The only relevant variable in the (R,F )
contract is the the interest rate, which implies that the firms are free to set the fee at the
level they see fit. This open the way for a new strategy based on deceit.
Suppose, for instance, that all the other firms set R = 1 (the equilibrium level when
agents are sophisticated). A positive profit can be made with the following strategy : offer
a one period contract with a “discount” interest rate R < 1 and the possibility to rollover
at cost R + F 11. All agents will take the contract, and then a fraction G(1/(R + F ))
will rollover (those whose preferences are such that β ≤ 1/(R + F )). The firm will loose
R − 1 per contract on the one period borrowers (whose mass is 1 − G(1/(R + F )) and
gain R(R + F ) − 1 per contract on the G(1/(R + F )) individuals who will rollover. The
expected profit of the firm thus writes :
Π(R,F ) = (R(R+ F )− 1)G
(
1
R+ F
)
+ (R− 1)
(
1−G
(
1
R+ F
))
(15)
which is positive for some R < 1 and F > 0 (see the end of appendix D.1). Of course, all
other firms will offer the same contract. Then free entry implies, again, that the equilibrium
will be a zero-profit one. A symmetric equilibrium will therefore be characterized by the
following three conditions : (i) all firms choose the same interest rate R ; (ii) each firm
chooses the penalty fee F so as to maximize her expected profit given R ; (iii) expected
profits are null. In the appendix D.1, we show that these three conditions imply that the
equilibrium (R,F ) are :
RcN =
1 +
√
β0
2
(16)
F cN =
1√
β0
− 1 +
√
β0
2
(17)
where the superscript c stands for competition, and the subscript N for fully na¨ıve.
5.2 The equilibrium with partially na¨ıve agents
Recall that the agent’s population is divided in two groups : the sophisticated ones
(those with β ≥ β¯) and the partially na¨ıves (those with β < β¯). Both groups are aware of
their time inconsistency problem and, therefore, do realize the commitment value of the
fee. The big difference between the two groups is that the partially na¨ıve can be fooled by
an appropriate contracts, whereas the sophisticated cannot.
The deceitful contract has the same structure as before : a one period lending contract
with a “discount” interest rate R < 1, and the possibility to rollover at cost R + F . The
key condition is that R and F must verify :
β¯ ≥ 1
R+ F
(18)
Condition (18) implies that nobody expect to roll-over, since the expected discount factor
is β˜(β) ≥ β¯ ≥ 1/(R + F ). When the firms offer this kind of contract, the game is very
much the same as the one played with fully na¨ıve agents. The firms are free to set the
11The firm may also propose a portfolio of two contracts, where contract 1 is the standard contract at
rate R = 1 (with costless rollover) and contract 2 is the discount contract (R < 1), with a penalty F in
case of rollover. The outcome will be the same, since the expected surplus from contract 1 (1− β) is lower
than the expected surplus for contract 2 (1− βR) for all na¨ıves.
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level of the fee, since all agents consider that the fee is big enough to deter rollover (and
nobody expects to pay the fee). Therefore firms compete by offering the lowest interest
rate. Free entry implies a zero-profit equilibrium.
A symmetric equilibrium will therefore be characterized by the following three condi-
tions : (i) all firms choose the same interest rate R ; (ii) each firm chooses the penalty fee
F so as to maximize her expected profit given R subject to condition (18); (iii) expected
profits are null. It is easy to show (see appendix D.2) that there are two equilibrium
configuration.
The constrained equilibrium arises when the share of partially na¨ıve agents is low
(β¯ <
√
β0). F is such that all the partially na¨ıve rollover R + F = 1/β¯. Then, the zero
profit condition yields :
RcPN =
β¯(1− β0)
β¯(1− β0) + (1− β¯)(β¯ − β0)
(19)
F cPN =
1
β¯
− β¯(1− β0)
β¯(1− β0) + (1− β¯)(β¯ − β0)
(20)
where the subscript PN stands for partially na¨ıve.
The unconstrained equilibrium arises when the share of partially na¨ıve agents is high
(β¯ ≥ √β0). The firms make the same choice as in the fully na¨ıve case. Therefore :
RcPN = R
c
N (21)
F cPN =
1√
β0
−RcN ≡ F cN (22)
and RcPN+F
c
PN = 1/
√
β0 > 1/β¯. Figures (13) and (14) show the equilibrium F and R as a
function of the index of na¨ıvete´ β¯. Both the fee and the interest rate decrease with β¯ (this
is a general result, ∂RcPN/∂β¯ < 0 and ∂F
c
PN/∂β¯ < 0, ∀β¯ ∈]β0, 1]). Incumbent firms react
to the increase of the share of the na¨ıves G(β¯), by cutting the penalty fee F , which reduces
the profit par na¨ıve customer but increases the market share of the exploitative contracts.
The latter effect dominates as long as 1/(R + F ) ≤ √β0 (recall that R + F = 1/
√
β0
maximizes the expected profit for fully na¨ıve borrowers). Positive profits lead to the entry
of new firms, which brings down the interest rate.
Note that the pricing policy engenders a cross-subsidy from the na¨ıves to the so-
phisticated individuals (and some of the na¨ıves too when β¯ ≥ √β0). Each one of the
G(1/(R+F )) na¨ıves that roll-over “pays”R(R+F )−1 to the 1−G(1/(R+F )) individuals
that manage to stick to the one period loan. Note also that, somewhat counterintuitively,
the intensity of exploitation (as measured by the penalty fee) is globally decreasing with
the index of na¨ıvete´, and is maximal when the share of na¨ıves id close to zero.
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6 A Welfare Analysis
6.1 A paternalistic approach
Evaluating the borrower’s welfare is difficult since preferences are time-varying. One
solution, proposed by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a,b), is to distinguish between the
long-run welfare and the actual welfare. Note that the intertemporal utility of the agent
can be rewritten as :
ut + β
∑
s≥t+1
δs−tus = (1− β)ut + βV LRt (23)
where V LRt =
∑
s≥t δ
s−tus stands as the long run utility of the agent. With this formula-
tion the actual intertemporal utility of the individual is an average of his short-run utility
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(ut) and his long-run utility (V
LR
t ). Rabin asserts that V
LR
t , which is time-consistent, is
the relevant measure of the agent’s welfare.
With V LRt as the welfare index any type of borrowing is harmful in a monopoly setting
since R > 1 (recall that δ = 1 and ut is linear). In this sense all contracts that lead
some agents to borrow either for one period or two periods are exploitative in a monopoly
setting. The aggregate welfare losses are just equal to the monopoly profits, which are an
increasing function of the index of na¨ıvete´ β¯ (this is due to the fact that the net global
surplus is equal to zero). However the individual losses depend on a non trivial way on
the borrower’s impatience β and na¨ıvete´ β˜(β). When all the individuals are sophisticated,
the more impatient (those who take a two-period loan) loose 1− (RS)2 each, whereas the
patient borrowers (those who take a one-period loan) loose 1−RS each 12. When all the
individuals are na¨ıves, all those who borrow take a two-period loan which leads to a loss
equal to 1−(RN )2. This loss is clearly greater that the losses incurred by any sophisticated
borrower, weather patient or impatient, since RN > RS . Yet the partially na¨ıves may loose
more than the fully na¨ıves. The patient ones (those who borrow for one period) pay a
higher interest rate (RSN > RN ), and the impatient ones end up paying a two-period loan
plus a penalty fee, which leads to a loss equal to 1−RSN (RSN + FSN ) < 1− (RN )2 (her
loss is greater than the loss sustained by a fully na¨ıve that take a two-period loan). Partial
na¨ıvete´ is therefore worse than full na¨ıvete´ for those who borrow.
Perfect competition drives the profits to zero. This has a positive impact on the
average borrower’s welfare, which is now equal to zero (recall that the net global surplus
is zero). However the impact of competition on individuals crucially depends on their
na¨ıvete´. Sophisticated individuals (those who manage to borrow for one period) can’t
loose from competition. When everybody is sophisticated (β¯ = β0), the interest rate is
R = 1, which implies that all individuals have a surplus equal to zero. When some of
the individuals are na¨ıve, the sophisticated earn a positive surplus since R < 1. Note
that this surplus rises with the index of na¨ıvete´ β¯ (since R is a decreasing function of
β¯). The gains of the sophisticated are the losses of the na¨ıves (those who borrow for two
periods and therefore pay the penalty fee). It must be noted that the losses of the na¨ıves
1−R(R+F ) are, generally, lower under competition. Let’s show this when all individuals
are fully na¨ıve. Under monopoly, all individuals in the [β0, 1/RN ] interval borrow for one
period and then rollover, which lead to a loss equal to 1− (RN )2 (there is no penalty fee).
Under perfect competition, the same applies for all the individuals in the [β0,
√
β0] interval,
which lead to a loss equal to 1 − RcN (RcN + F cN ). The welfare loss under competition is
lower since RcN (R
c
N + F
c
N ) = R
c
N/
√
β0 < 1/
√
β0 < RN < (RN )
2. Yet some na¨ıves are
made worse off by competition : those who do not borrow under monopoly (those whose
β ∈]1/RN ,
√
β0]). Figure 15 show the extent of two period borrowing under monopoly
and perfect competition.
12Note that there is always a fraction a of the potential borrowers (the very patient) that choose to
abstain from borrowing.
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Figure 15: Exploitative contracts under monopoly and perfect competition with fully na¨ıve
agents
The same logic applies under partial na¨ıvete´. The na¨ıves that roll-over under monopoly
and competition benefit from competition, since they pay lower rates (including the penalty
fee). But the na¨ıves who do not borrow under monopoly are made worse-off by competi-
tion. 13
6.2 Welfare from the point of view of self one
Using the long run utility as a measure of welfare has one big drawback : it may lead
to violate the individual’s choice at each point of time. This certainly can be considered as
hard paternalism. Sunstein and Thaler (2003) preconize a softer approach, which they call
libertarian paternalism14. The purpose of libertarian paternalism is to help the individual
to make freely the “right” choices. This implies that another welfare measure must be
chosen. Utility at time one seems to be the natural choice, since it represents the wills of
at least one of the multiple selves of the individual and is not too far from the long-run
utility 15. Note that the credit market is no longer useless, as it fulfills the “legitimate”
need for credit of self one. Lending for one period creates a surplus equal to 1− δ, which
is shared between the bank and the borrower.
Sophisticated agents cannot loose from borrowing. Their need for commitment devices
is partially fulfilled under monopoly (they would prefer a higher penalty fee), and entirely
fulfilled under competition (since the optimal contract deters them from renewing the
loan). Competition clearly benefits them since they take the whole surplus of the exchange
(plus a transfer from the na¨ıves).
Na¨ıves may loose from borrowing under monopoly, since they over-estimate the benefits
of the loan. For instance when all the borrowers are fully na¨ıve, of all the individuals who
borrow and then roll-over the loan, all those whose β ∈](1/RN )2, 1/RN ] have a welfare
loss. This is no longer the case under perfect competition. The individuals that roll-over
the loan have a welfare gain equal to 1 − βRcN (RcN + F cN ) = 1 − βRcN/
√
β0 > 0 (since
β <
√
β0). In fact all na¨ıves are made better off by competition, even those who do not
13There are in fact two cases. When the index of na¨ıvete´ is low (β¯ ≤ √β0), the same population borrows
and roll-over under monopoly and competition (those whose β ∈ [β0, β¯]). Therefore nobody looses from
competition. When the index of na¨ıvete´ is high (β¯ >
√
β0), a fraction of the individuals that borrow
and roll-over under competition do not so under monopoly (those whose β ∈]1/RN ,
√
β0]). This is the
population that looses from competition.
14Camerer et al. (2003) use the term “asymmetric paternalism”, others prefer the slightly ironic “soft
paternalism”.
15We mean, of course, self one real utility (the one he will derive by his effective consumption path), as
opposed to his expected utility.
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roll-over under monopoly16. These results extend to the partially na¨ıve case17.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the equilibrium predatory practices that may arise when the bor-
rowers have behavioral weaknesses. Rational lenders offer short term contracts that can
be renewed at the cost of paying a penalty fee. We show how the optimal contracts depend
on the degree of na¨ıvete´ of the time inconsistent customers. Penalty fees have a dual role :
they increase market share by providing a useful commitment device to time-inconsistent
but otherwise rational borrowers ; they are also a source of revenue from the semi-na¨ıve
borrowers who understand the need for commitment but fail to forecast their future time
discount factor. We also show that perfect competition does not eliminate predatory prac-
tices, since the equilibrium contract entails a subsidized (below marginal cost) short-term
loan that can only be profitable if a fraction of the borrowers end up paying the penalty
fee.
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A Sophisticated borrowers
A.1 The profit function when F ≥ 1
β0
−
√
1
β0
In this case, the profit function writes :
Π(R,F ) =
{
(R2 − 1)G
(
1
R+F
)
+ (R− 1)
[
G
(
1
R
)−G( 1R+F )] if 1≤R< 1β0−F
(R− 1)G ( 1R) if 1β0−F≤R≤ 1β0 (24)
Proof. All individuals choose one-period contract when 1/β0 − F ≤ R ≤ 1/β0, since
they are profitable (βR < 1, ∀β) and the individuals know that they will not rollover
(β(R + F ) > 1, ∀β). The profit is therefore (R − 1) times the number of contracts
G(1/R). R < 1/β0 − F < 1/
√
β0 imply that β0 < 1/(R + F ) < 1/R
2 < 1/R (recall
that F ≥ 1/β0 −
√
1/β0 =⇒ RF ≥
√
β0). From this we know that : (i) some individuals
will roll-over (those such that β < 1/(R + F )); (ii) 2-period contracts are profitable
for those individuals (since 1/(R + F ) < 1/R2). All the other individuals choose one-
period contracts. The profit is therefore (R2 − 1) times the number of 2-period contracts
G(1/(R+F )) plus (R−1) times the number of one-period contractsG(1/R)−G(1/(R+F )).
Let’s show that the optimal F cannot be greater than 1β0 −
√
1
β0
.
First we show that the interest rate R∗ that maximizes Π(R,F ) (for a given F ≥
1/β0 −
√
1/β0) lies in the interval ]1, 1/
√
β0]. Let’s assume that R
∗ > 1/β0 − F . The
profit function then writes Π(R,F ) = (R − 1)G(1/R) = Π1(R). The first and second
derivative of Π1(R) are :
Π′1(R) =
1
β0
(
1
R
− β0 − 1 + 1
R2
)
Π′′1(R) = −
1
β0
(
1
R2
+
2
R3
)
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Π′′1(R) < 0 implies that Π1(R) has a unique maximum and Π
′
1(1/
√
β0) =
√
β0−1
β0−1 < 0 =⇒
R∗ < 1/
√
β0.
R∗ < 1/
√
β0 implies that 1/(R
∗ + F ) < (1/R∗)2 (since RF > 1/
√
β0). Such a configu-
ration can’t be optimal since the profit can be increased by reducing F (which allows the
firm to replace one-period contracts by the 2-period ones). This shows that the optimal
F is such that F < 1/β0 −
√
1/β0.
A.2 The optimum
Taking into account that the optimal F is such that F = RF (RF − 1), we can write
the profit function as :
ΠS(F ) =
(
R2F − 1
)
G
(
1
R2F
)
+ (RF − 1)
(
G
(
1
RF
)
−G
(
1
RF + F
))
= RF (RF − 1)G
(
1
R2F
)
+ (RF − 1)G
(
1
RF
)
=
1
1− β0
(
F ×
(
1
R2F
− β0
)
+ (RF − 1)
(
1
RF
− β0
))
Using R′F =
dRF
dF =
1
2RF−1 and F = RF (RF − 1) we compute the first and second deriva-
tives :
Π′S(F ) =
1
1− β0
(
1
R2F
− β0 − 2F R
′
F
R3F
+
R′F
R2F
− β0R′F
)
=
2
1− β0 ×
R2F − β0R4F − F
R3F (2RF − 1)
=
2
1− β0 ×
1− β0R3F
R2F (2RF − 1)
Π′′S(F ) =
2R′F
1− β0 ×
β0R
3
F − 6RF + 2
R3F (2RF − 1)2
= − 2
1− β0 ×
3
R3F (2RF − 1)2
< 0
Since Π′′S(F ) < 0 the maximum of the function ΠS is attained when Π
′
S(F ) = 0 ⇔ RF =
(1/β0)
1/3.
B Fully na¨ıve borrowers
Since FN = 0, RN is the maximum of the function :
ΠN = Π(R, 0) = (R
2 − 1)G(1/R) = (R
2 − 1)(1/R− β0)
1− β0
in the interval [1, 1/β0]. The function ΠN (R) is concave (since Π
′′
N (R) = −2β0+1/R
3
1−β0 ). The
maximum is the solution of
Π′N (R) =
1
1− β0
(
1− 2β0R+ 1
R2
)
= 0
which yields a cubic equation (−2β0R3+R2+1 = 0). Since Π′N (1) = 2 > 0 and Π′N (1/β0) =
−(1 + β0) < 0, this equation has a unique solution in the interval [1, 1/β0].
Π′N (1/
√
β0) = (1−
√
β0)
2/(1− β0) > 0 implies that 1/
√
β0 < RN < 1/β0.
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C Partially Na¨ıve borrowers
C.1 The profit function
For the sake of simplicity we write the profit function as a function of R and Z = R+F .
There are five different regions (see figures 16 and 17 for a mapping in the (R,Z) space).
Hereupon we show that the profit function writes, when β0 < β¯ <
√
β0 (figure 16 and 17)
Π(R,Z) =


Π1(R,Z)≡(R−1)G( 1R) if Z≥ 1β0 and R≤Z
Π2(R,Z)≡R(Z−1)G( 1Z )+(R−1)G( 1R) if 1β¯≤Z<
1
β0
and R≤Z
Π3(R,Z)≡(R−1)[G( 1R)−G( 1Z )] if Z< 1β¯ and
1√
β0
≤R≤Z
Π4(R,Z)≡(R2−1)G
(
1
R2
)
+(R−1)[G( 1R)−G( 1Z )] if Z< 1β¯ and
√
Z≤R<max
{
Z, 1√
β0
}
Π5(R,Z)≡R(R−1)G( 1Z )+(R−1)G( 1R) if Z< 1β¯ and R<
√
Z
(25)
and, for β0 <
√
β0 ≤ β¯ (figure 18):
Π(R,Z) =


Π1(R,Z)≡(R−1)G( 1R) if Z≥ 1β0 and R≤Z
Π2(R,Z)≡R(Z−1)G( 1Z )+(R−1)G( 1R) if 1β¯≤Z<
1
β0
and R≤Z
Π4(R,Z)≡(R2−1)G
(
1
R2
)
+(R−1)[G( 1R)−G( 1Z )] if Z< 1β¯ and
√
Z≤R≤Z
Π5(R,Z)≡R(R−1)G( 1Z )+(R−1)G( 1R) if Z< 1β¯ and R<
√
Z
(26)
Proof:
Region 1: Z ≥ 1β0 and R ≤ Z =⇒ 1/Z ≤ β0 < β¯ < 1/R. All individuals choose the
one period contract, since they don’t expect to rollover (β˜(β) ≥ β¯ > 1/Z, ∀β). No one
rollovers since β ≥ β0 > 1/Z. The profit is (R−1) times the number of contracts G(1/R).
Region 2: 1
β¯
≤ Z < 1β0 and R ≤ Z =⇒ β0 < 1/Z ≤ β¯ < 1/R. As before all
individuals choose the one period contract. But some individuals will rollover (those with
β < 1/Z). The profit is (R−1) times the number of one period contracts G(1/R)−G(1/Z)
plus RZ − 1 times the number of individual who rollover G(1/Z).
Region 3: Z < 1
β¯
and 1√
β0
≤ R ≤ Z =⇒ 1/R2 ≤ β0 < β¯ < 1/Z < 1/R. All individ-
uals with β > 1/Z choose (rightly) the one period contracts since β˜(β) = β > 1/Z, ∀β >
1/Z. All the other individuals expect to rollover, and thus abstain from borrowing (two-
period contracts are not profitable since β > 1/R2, ∀β). The profit is (R − 1) times the
number of one period contracts G(1/R)−G(1/Z).
Region 4: Z < 1
β¯
and
√
Z < R < max
{
Z, 1√
β0
}
=⇒ β0 < max{β¯, 1/R2} ≤ 1/Z <
1/R. Same logic as in the previous case. All the individuals with β < 1/Z rightly expects
to rollover. They either abstain from borrowing or choose a two period contract (which
is profitable for those with β < 1/R2). The profit is (R − 1) times the number of one
period contracts G(1/R)−G(1/Z) plus R2 − 1 times the number of two period contracts
G(1/R2).
Region 5: Z < 1
β¯
and R ≤ √Z =⇒ β0 < β¯ < 1/Z < 1/R2 < 1/R. Same logic as in
the previous case. All the individuals with β < 1/Z choose a two period contract. The
profit is (R− 1) times the number of one period contracts G(1/R)−G(1/Z) plus R2 − 1
times the number of two period contracts G(1/Z).
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C.2 The profit maximizing strategy when the borrowers are partially
na¨ıve
It is easy to see that the profit function is not convex, and has several discontinuities
(the profit jumps between region 2,3 and 4 and between region 2 and region 5). Our
method is first to compute the sign of the partial derivatives in each region in order to
locate the local maxima, and then compare those maxima. The arrows in figures 16, 17
and 18 show the “directions” that the firm must follow to increase her profit.
We distinguish three cases.
Case 1: β0 ≤ β¯ <
√
β0 and RSN =
√
β¯
β0−β¯(1−β¯) <
1
β¯
The optimum profit strategy are :
(S) R =
(
1
β0
)1/3
≡ RS and Z =
(
1
β0
)2/3
if β0 ≤ β¯ < β¯1
(SN) R =
√
β¯
β0−β¯(1−β¯) ≡ RSN and Z = 1/β¯ if β¯1 ≤ β¯ < β¯2
where β¯1 < β¯2 < 1 are given at the end of the subsection.
Proof.
First we show that the optimal strategy in this configuration must be either (S) or
(SN) (see figure 16). Let’s begin with region 1. The profit function does not depends on
Z. The derivative with respect to R is :
(1− β0) ∂Π1(R,Z)
∂R
=
1
R2
− β0
(
<
>
)
0 if R
(
>
<
) 1√
β0
The local maximum is therefore attained when R = 1/
√
β0 (∀Z ≥ 1/β0). But the global
optimum cannot lie in region 1 since Π2(R,Z)−Π1(R,Z) = (RZ − 1)G(1/Z) > 0 ∀Z > 1.
Let’s move to region 2. The partial derivatives of the profit function are :
(1− β0) ∂Π2(R,Z)
∂Z
= R
(
1
Z2
− β0
)
< 0 since Z >
1
β¯
>
1√
β0
(1− β0) ∂Π2(R,Z)
∂R
= (Z − 1)
(
1
Z
− β0
)
+
1
R2
− β0
(
<
=
>
)
0 if R
(
>
=
<
)
ϕ(Z)
where ϕ(Z) =
√
Z
1−Z(1−β0Z) is a continuous function that crosses the frontier with region
3 in R = RSN and the frontier with region 1 in R = 1/
√
β0.
Since ∂Π2/∂Z < 0, the local maximum lies in the western frontier of region 2 (Z = 1/β¯)
18, whereas the sign of ∂Π2/∂R implies that the optimal interest rate is RSN = ϕ(1/β¯)
(see figure 16).
Now we examine region 3. The partial derivatives are :
(1− β0) ∂Π3(R,Z)
∂Z
=
R− 1
Z2
> 0
(1− β0) ∂Π3(R,Z)
∂R
=
1
R2
− 1
Z
< 0 since R >
√
Z
18The local maximum can’t lie in the line R = Z since ∂Π2/∂R < 0 when R = Z.
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R and Z are therefore pushed toward the frontiers with region 4 and 2 (see figure 16).
Note that the profit function jumps upward when the frontier between region 3 and region
2 is crossed, since :
Π2(R, 1/β¯)−Π3(R, 1/β¯) = β¯ − β0
1− β0
(
R
β¯
− 1
)
> 0
This implies that the optimum can’t lie in region 3.
Now let’s examine region 4 and 5. The partial derivatives are :
(1− β0) ∂Π4(R,Z)
∂Z
=
R− 1
Z2
> 0
(1− β0) ∂Π4(R,Z)
∂R
= 2
(
1
R3
− β0
)
+
1
R2
− 1
Z
(
<
>
)
0 if Z
(
<
>
)
ψ(R)
(1− β0) ∂Π5(R,Z)
∂Z
= −R(R− 1)
Z2
< 0
(1− β0) ∂Π5(R,Z)
∂R
= (2R− 1)
(
1
Z
− β0
)
+
1
R2
− 1
Z
> 0 since R ≤
√
Z
where ψ(R) =
(
2
(
1
R3
− β0
)
+ 1
R2
)−1
is an increasing function of R which cross the R = Z
line in Z = Z1 ∈]1, (1/β0)2/3[ and the frontier between region 4 and 5 in R = (1/β0)1/3
and Z = (1/β0)
2/3.
The sign of the derivatives imply that the local maximum lies in the frontier between
region 4 and 5. It is easy to check that the local optimum is such that : R = (1/β0)
1/3 = RS
and Z = (1/β0)
2/3 = ZS (see figure 16)
19.
Now we show that strategy (S) is chosen for low β¯ whereas strategy (SN) is optimal
otherwise. Let’s compute the optimal profit for both strategies :
ΠS = Π4 (RS , ZS) =
1− β1/30
1− β0
(
2− β1/30 − β2/30
)
ΠSN = Π2 (RSN , ZSN ) =
1
1− β0
(
1 + β0 − 2
RSN
)
Thus ΠS > ΠSN when :
RSN =
√
β¯
β0 − β¯(1− β¯)
>
2
3β
1/3
0 − 1
which is verified for all β¯ ∈ [β0, β¯1[, where β¯1 = −b−
√
b2−4ac
2 (with a = 1, b = −(1+(3β
1/3
0 −
1)2/4) and c = β0) is the unique positive solution of the equation :
β¯2 −
(
1 +
1
4
(
3β
1/3
0 − 1
)2)
β¯ + β0 = 0
Now we compute the upper bound β¯2. The strategy (SN) is chosen when β¯ ≥ β¯1 and :
RSN ≤ ZSN = 1/β¯ ⇐⇒
√
β¯
β0 − β¯(1− β¯)
≤ 1/β¯
β¯2 therefore solves the following cubic equation :
Υ(β¯) = β¯3 − β¯2 + β¯ − β0 = 0
It is easy to check that equation Υ(β¯) = 0 has a unique solution in the interval [β1, 1].
20
19The optimum strategy is RS = argmaxΠ4(R,R
2) and ZS = R
2.
20Υ(β0) = β
2
0(β0 − 1) < 0, Υ(1) = 1− β0 > 0 and Υ′(β¯) = 3β¯2 − 2β¯ + 1 > 0, ∀β¯ ∈ [β0, 1]
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Case 2: β0 ≤ β¯ <
√
β0, RSN =
√
β¯
β0−β¯(1−β¯) ≥
1
β¯
and RN < 1/β¯
The optimum profit strategy is :
(NS) R = 1/β¯ = RNS and Z = 1/β¯ = ZNS for β¯2 ≤ β¯ < β¯3
where β¯3 is given at the end of the subsection.
Proof.
As before (see figure 17) there is a local optimum at the frontier between region 4 and
5 (R = RS and Z = ZS). We shall prove that this optimum can’t be the global one
The other local optimum lies either at the western frontier or at the northern frontier
of region 2 (since ∂Π2/∂Z < 0). The profit maximizing strategy at the western frontier
(the one such that Z = 1/β¯) is R = Z = 1/β¯ since ∂Π2(R, 1/β¯)/∂R > 0. This strat-
egy is also the profit maximizing strategy at the northern frontier since RN < 1/β¯ ⇒
dΠ2(R,R)/dR < 0∀R ≥ 1/β¯. 21
Therefore β¯3 = 1/RN (since R = Z = 1/β¯ is no longer the profit maximizing strategy
when RN ≥ 1/β¯).
Let’s show that the (NS) strategy is better than the (S) strategy when β¯ ∈ [β¯2, β¯3[.
The profit of the (NS) strategy writes :
ΠNS = Π2
(
1/β¯, 1/β¯
)
=
β¯ − β0
1− β0
(
1
β¯2
− 1
)
Therefore :
dΠNS
dR
=
1
1− β0
(
− 1
β¯2
+ 2
β0
β¯3
− 1
)
It is easy to show that dΠNS/dβ¯ > 0 if β¯2 ≤ β¯ < 1/RN 22. This and ΠNS = ΠSN > ΠS
for β¯ = β¯2 imply that ΠNS > ΠS ∀β¯ ∈ [β¯2, β¯3[.
Case 3: RN ≥ 1/β¯ 23
The optimum profit strategy is :
(N) R = RN and Z = ZN for β¯3 ≤ β¯ ≤ 1
Proof.
As seen in figure 18, there is a local optimum at the frontier between region 4 and 5
and another at the northern frontier of region 2 (since dΠ2/dR > 0). The profit function
in the latter case writes:
ΠN = Π2(R,R) =
(
R2 − 1)G (1/R2)
which is also the profit when the agents are fully na¨ıve. The unique maximum of ΠN is
attained when dΠN/dR = 0 ⇔ R = RN (see section B for the full proof).
21Recall that RN is the profit maximizing strategy for fully na¨ıve agents.
22Let dΠNS/dβ¯ = Ω(β¯). Simple algebra yields Ω(β¯2) = − β¯
2
2
−β0
1−β0
> 0 (since β¯ <
√
β0) and Ω(β¯3) = 0
(since β¯3 = 1/RN and −2β0R3N + R2N + 1 = 0). This and the fact that β¯3 is the only solution of the the
equation Ω(β¯) = 0 in the interval [β0, 1] implies that Ω(β¯) > 0, ∀β¯ ∈ [β¯2, β¯3[
23There a two sub-cases : case 3.a (such that β¯ <
√
β0 and RN > 1/β¯) and case 3.b (β¯ ≥
√
β0 ⇒ RN >
1/β¯). Figure 18 represents case 3.b
25
The (N) strategy is always better than the (S) strategy since ΠN ≥ ΠNS > ΠSN > ΠS .
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Figure 16: A mapping of the profit function when β0 < β¯ <
√
β0 and RSN < 1/β¯
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Figure 17: A mapping of the profit function when β0 < β¯ <
√
β0, RSN ≥ 1/β¯ and
RN < 1/β¯
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Figure 18: A mapping of the profit function when β0 <
√
β0 ≤ β¯ and RN > 1/β¯
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D The impact of competition
D.1 Fully na¨ıve borrowers
The equilibrium is such that : (i) all firms choose the same R ; (ii) each firm chooses F
so as to maximize her expected profit given R ; (iii) expected profits are null. Assuming
that there is a continuum of firms of size m (the variable m is unimportant), condition (ii)
implies :
F ∗(R) = argmax
F
Πi(R,F ) =
1
m
[
(R(R+ F − 1)G
(
1
R+ F
)
+ (R− 1)
]
where Πi(R,F ), the profit of firm i, is a concave function of F . Thus :
∂Πi(R,F )
∂F
=
1
m
R
1− β0
(
1
(R+ F )2
− β0
)
= 0 =⇒ F ∗(R) = 1√
β0
−R
The zero profit condition (iii) then writes :
Πi(R,F
∗(R)) =
1
m
[
2R
1 +
√
β0
− 1
]
= 0
which yield RcN = (1 +
√
β0)/2 and F
c
N = F
∗(RcN ).
We use these calculations to show that the expected profit of a firm that chooses R < 1
and F > 0 when all other firms choose R = 1 is positive for some F . Let R = 1 − ϵ and
F ∗(1− ϵ) be the interest rate and the fee chosen by the firm. Her profit writes :
Πi(1− ϵ, F ∗(1− ϵ)) =
[
2(1− ϵ)
1 +
√
β0
− 1
]
which is positive ∀ ϵ < (1−√β0)/2.
D.2 Partially na¨ıve borrowers
The fee is chosen so as to maximize the expected profit per consumer subject to con-
dition (18) :
F ∗∗(R) = argmax
F
Πi(R,F ) =
1
m
[
(R(R+ F − 1)G
(
1
R+ F
)
+ (R− 1)
]
s.t. R+F ≥ 1/β¯
This program has two solutions : constrained and unconstrained. The unconstrained
solution is the one given in appendix D.1. It arises when R+ F ∗ = 1/
√
β0 ≥ 1/β¯.
The constrained solution is such that : R + F ∗∗ = 1/β¯ and ∂Π∂F < 0 (which is a
consequence of R+ F ∗∗ = 1/
√
β0 < 1/β¯). Then the profit writes :
Πi(R,F
∗∗(R)) = R
(
1
β¯
− 1
)
β¯ − β0
1− β0 +R− 1
The zero profit condition Πi(R,F
∗∗(R)) = 0 yield the equilibrium value RcPN and F
c
PN =
1/β¯ −RcPN .
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